But it is also supercharged and may be designed to comply with a different
emissions rule (either Australian or overseas).  Even bolting a turbo or
supercharger onto an original engine (eg a gutless Toyota 3L diesel engine
with a turbo that takes it from totally gutless to boringly slow  :-) ) is
required to be certified.  In all cases, unless the exhaust system is the
original system for the new engine, which is known to comply with the right
noise ADR for the year of the vehicle, it'll need a noise test.

With a known emission complying engine being dropped into a car, it still
has to be engineered but doesn't need emission testing (or smoke testing,
in the case of filthy pre-emission diesels).

If they weren't an original option on that model in Australia, they need
to be certified.

That's the case for NSW at least.  Your mileage may vary.  :-)

That's a tad simplistic. There is no anti-corruption purpose to be
served by recording the identity of the person making a query when the
query is made on the person's behalf by an automatic number plate
reading system, and the response is that the vehicle is not of interest.

Flagging the fact that each number has been queried, and by whom, even
in that common case, would create a significant system load - for which
read cost.

Sylvia.

Doesnt stop ya mtes from finding stuff though, it just means that they have to back it up with a
plausible argument.  One of the favourites seems to be QV- Suspicious person lurking around parked
car and found not to be owner.

I have heard of some VERY dodgy reasons for looking up details.  A mate wanted to buy a car but
couldnt find its owner as every time he hung around they never showed and when he did leave it later
they had gone so had a QV done and ended up buying the car.  To this day he wont tell me what he
said to its owner to how he found them as it wasnt them that drove it on a regular basis but thier
partner.  That could take some explaining if he was caught Id say.

                      crap

Then again; such data can be quarantined from use in other
investigations.

And that is indeed the case in countries like Germany where
systematic surveillance of the public is unconsitutional.
Evidence from each investigation "falls through a trap-door".
It cannot be used elsewhere. It is indeed unlawful to do a trawl for
offences.

Unlike Australia, going for a half-hour drive in Germany shows that
Police are actively stopping and dealing with stuff as it happens.
They're not all hiding behind a mouse in a poorly-ventilated office.

There are also speed cameras ... but few Police forces take them
seriously at all; because they've been recognized to have no
significant road safety benefit. The cameras are deployed for
political reasons; to provide revenue for local authorities; and to
give the illusion of power to some.

I think is bitter because he has missed his real calling in life. He
could have been a star at Barnum and Baily, billed as "The Talking Anus".

And for those not bothering to follow the link, the important bits are
here:

5. As commonly practised, and as supported by currently available
technologies, ANPR represents a gross privacy intrusion, and in some
jurisdictions breaches privacy law, in the following ways:

   * it involves arbitrary collection of personal data not for a
specific, defined purpose to which it is clearly relevant, but
opportunistically and for vague purposes
   * it generates a very large database of personal data, containing:
         o registration data
         o one set ? but very probably multiple sets ? of:
               + the date and time of sighting
               + the location
               + the direction of movement
   * the database can be used to draw inferences and generate
suspicions
   * the database is a 'honeypot' that attracts attention from many
organisations for many purposes, resulting in 'scope creep'
   * the database is impossible to protect against unauthorised access,
resulting in leakage of content

6. As commonly practised, and as supported by currently available
technologies, ANPR is a mass surveillance technique and breaches the
human right of liberty of movement (UDHR 13.1, ICCPR 12.1). More
specifically, with conventional ANPR:

   * an unknown proportion of the large data-holdings is unreliable,
and there is no simple or inexpensive way of sifting the accurate from
the inaccurate
   * suspicions can be readily generated, some of which are reasonable
and some of which are not, and there is no simple or inexpensive way of
sifting the reasonable from the unreasonable
   * embarrassment is created for law-abiding citizens who are
intercepted on the basis of incorrect data and unreasonable suspicion
   * danger is created for law-abiding citizens who are intercepted by
a law enforcement officer who has been given wrong information about the
possible dangerousness of the vehicle's occupants
   * the deterrent effect on miscreants appears unlikely to be all that
great
   * the unjustified chilling effect on law-abiding citizens appears
likely to be much greater than the deterrent effect on miscreants. This
applies especially to the many categories of persons at risk, including
victims of domestic violence, protected witnesses, celebrities, and
undercover law enforcement operatives

7. The practice of ANPR can readily become arbitrary interference by law
enforcement officers, in such ways as the following:

   * undue interception of false-positives
   * misunderstandings, unpleasantness and altercations between
officers and vehicle-occupants
   * further actions in relation to the intercepted vehicle, such as
roadworthiness inspections, bookings for minor transgressions (e.g.
broken light-covers and mirrors), and search on the off-chance of
finding infringing materials such as drugs
   * further actions in relation to the driver, such as delay,
questioning and search
   * further actions in relation to other vehicle occupants, such as
delay, questioning and search

8. The effects of the practice of ANPR on the public reputation of law
enforcement agencies and individuals can be positive, in that they will
be seen to be active, and to be effective; but run a great risk of being
seriously negative, in that they will be seen to be intrusive into the
activities of law-abiding citizens, and a key part of a 'police state'
apparatus that gathers vast quantities of information about people's
movements.

9. An alternative approach to ANPR addresses many of these issues. The
'blacklist in camera' design involves:

   * release from the on-site camera device of only those detections
that match to the current 'blacklist' of registration plates that are
being sought
   * certified non-accessibility and non-recording of any personal data
other than that arising under the above circumstances
   * substantial controls over the download of the blacklist to the
device and the maintenance of the blacklist
   * substantial controls over the quality of data used to prepare the
blacklist, and exclusion of sources of data that are of insufficient
quality

10. Considerable commitment and investment are required in order to
implement the alternative approach to ANPR in the face of the momentum
that has been achieved in some countries overseas by the orthodox,
grossly privacy-invasive form of ANPR.

11. It is vital that ANPR projects be conducted in a transparent manner,
including published information, consultation, privacy impact
assessment, and published results.

12. It is vital that Parliaments expressly preclude inappropriate
designs for uses of ANPR, and expressly authorise appropriate designs
for and uses of it.